t cht lk achieved several years ago . While we are perhaps years or even decades away from a Quantum General Computer , the fact that they could break standard forms of encryption that all digital security relies upon has been known about for years .
t cht lk achieved several years ago . While we are perhaps years or even decades away from a Quantum General Computer , the fact that they could break standard forms of encryption that all digital security relies upon has been known about for years .
The first and most significant point to note in quantum computing is that we don ’ t know when working , commercially available quantum computers will be created . Just as at the quantum level everything is a jumble of shifting probabilities and contradictions , the world of emerging quantum computers is similarly unclear . The systems themselves are being developed by governments and very large corporations such as IBM and Google , so the most up-to-date developments are often behind closed doors and any information in the public domain should always be treated with caution .
Any announcements that a company or government has achieved a new fastest quantum computer do not necessarily mean that we are much closer to working quantum computers . Current quantum computers make one error in every hundred operations , but to be truly useful they would need an error ratio of one in a trillion . Algorithms can be used to compensate for these errors to a point , but to truly correct for them major advances need to be made in the systems themselves – and the problem is so severe that IBM has a ten-year roadmap for developing fault-resistant quantum computers .
That in no way means that usable , fault tolerant quantum computers are guaranteed to arrive in 2034 but does mean that we need to question anyone who claims that it will arrive within the next few years .
I would always encourage all companies to carry out an audit of which of their resources need to be secure ( at the very least ), but there are industries in which deploying post-quantum cryptography should be a matter of absolute urgency .
Firstly , any company that sells goods with long life cycles . The average car spends 11 years on the road before being scrapped , and a lot can happen in that time .
You won ’ t know how long your components will be in use for , and their end-users may not know or be able to control the way they are secured , so it is best to be safe and protect them now .
Moreover , it is likely that the first instances of harm caused by quantum computing are going to be between state actors , as opposed to smaller cybercrime gangs . In this case , critical infrastructure such as power , water and transport will be the first civilian networks to be targeted – this has been the case for literally decades and will only become more dangerous as states have access to quantum computing .
As a rule of thumb , if a connected device is likely , or even possibly , going to be used for five years or more then you should make sure that it is prepared for quantum cryptography .
For a similar reason , companies that manufacture components used by other companies also need to look at their quantum security .
Similarly , it goes without saying that companies that either work directly with or around the defence industry , not just in their own country but in any , will be prime targets for state-based or aligned bad actors with access to quantum computing .
Finally , regulated entities such as those in financial services and healthcare keep long-term , highly
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